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The Family Estate Trust: Tax Myths and Realities 
The "pure equity" or "family estate" trust, a device widely 
marketed across the United States, is "guaranteed" by its propo- 
nents to alleviate the burdens of income taxation.' The trust is 
best described as an irrevocable, inter vivos, complex trust and 
is sold as a tax avoidance device2 to thousands of unsophisticated 
purchasers, often without full disclosure of its potential for gener- 
ating litigation. This Comment examines the probable income 
tax consequences of the family estate trust by contrasting the 
legal positions of the trust's proponents and Internal Revenue 
Service. 
Although currently marketed in various forms, the distin- 
guishing characteristic of the family estate trust is that the same 
individual fills four trust capacities: grantor, trust employee, 
trustee, and beneficiary. As grantor he transfers to the trust in fee 
simple his general passive assets, businesses, distributorships, 
1. Many of the guarantees come in the form of verbal testimonials on the validity 
and legality of the trusts, but some organizations provide that any challenge to the validity 
of the trust will be defended in court a t  no cost to the purchaser. 
The history of the family estate trust concept is somewhat obscure, but one account 
relates the story of Patrick Henry who allegedly set up the first such trust of record in 
America for Governor Robert Morris of Virginia in 1765. The trusts were apparently little 
publicized yet commonly used until the passage of the sixteenth amendment in 1913. 
Following the income tax amendment, the family estate trust went into a period of disuse 
until resurrected in the 1930's by Harry Morgan Phipps. The current surge of interest in 
these trusts is attributed to the promotional abilities of James R. Walsh, who in 1972 
revitalized Mr. Phipps' National Pure Trust Service format and created two sister organi- 
zations-Trust Inc. and Educational Scientific Publishers. See ESTATE GUARDIAN EDUCA- 
TIONAL TRUST, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PURE LMNG TRUST 1 (1976) (promotional 
material distributed by E.G.E.T., San Diego, Cal.); Hill, Tax Cuts for Sale, Wall St. J., 
July 13, 1977, at 1, col. 5. In addition to "pure equity" and "family estate," this trust 
instrument has also been referred to as the "Constitution," "apocalypse," "pure living," 
"Patrick Henry," "common law," and "family equity" trust. For the sake of convenience 
this Comment will refer to the trust concept, which encompasses all of the above deriva- 
tions to one extent or another, as the "family estate trust." 
2. Efforts to minimize taxes are neither illegal nor unethical. The classic statement 
on the subject was made by Judge Learned Hand: 
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arrang- 
ing one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or 
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the 
law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To 
demand more in the name of morals is mere cant. 
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848,850-51 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Knetsch v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U S .  465, 469 (1935); Chirel- 
stein, 1,earned Handk Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968). 
7061 FAMILY ESTATE TRUSTS 707 
farms, and family residence, receiving units of beneficial interest 
in r e t ~ r n . ~  As trust employee he contractually relinquishes to the 
trust all his personal services, which may then be leased or loaned 
out to third-party employers at  the discretion of the trustees. As 
trustee he, along with other trustees, is responsible for adminis- 
tering the trust and leasing out its employees to employers, pa- 
tients, or clients who compensate the trust d i r e ~ t l y . ~  Finally, as 
beneficiary he shares in the income of the trust to the extent of 
the units he retains after conveying his other units to his spouse, 
children, or other trusts. 
11. COMPETING POSITIONS OF THE IRS AND TRUST PROPONENTS 
Proponents of the family estate trust maintain that the de- 
vice minimizes income taxation yet remains in total compliance 
with the letter of state trust law, the Internal Revenue Code, and 
3. Units are essentially fractions of the beneficial ownership of the trust. For example, 
in a 100-unit trust where the grantor conveys away all but fifteen units, he has retained a 
15% interest in the trust income and assets. 
In a community property jurisdiction, or where the husband and wife own the assets 
to be conveyed to the trust in joint tenancy, it is necessary that one spouse's interest be 
granted to the other spouse who then conveys the assets to the trust in fee simple in return 
for 100 units of beneficial interest. The grantor then transfers to the other spouse one-half 
(50) of the units in consideration of the prior interest in the community or joint tenancy. 
Each spouse then has 50 units to retain or convey as he or she desires. The grantor, who 
is generally the primary wage earner for the family, usually transfers the majority of his 
units to his children or other trusts in order to further split the trust income. The grantor's 
spouse likewise conveys away some units, but is advised to retain a sufficient interest to 
maximize the likelihood of treatment as an adverse party. The units allegedly qualify as 
a present interest in a security (the trust property), but, because of the discretionary 
control over the trust by the trustees, the value of the units is considerably less than the 
value of the underlying trust assets. Gift tax valuation on the units conveyed away is 
determined on their remainder interest value as discounted according to Treas. Reg. § 
25.2512-5 (1970). See EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHERS, A LAWYER'S DISCUSSION OF THE 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE FAMILY EQUITY TRUST 5-6 (1978) (promotional pamphlet distributed 
by E.S. Publishers, Houston, Tex.) . 
The irrevocability of the conveyance raises serious questions as to potential problems 
in the event of a divorce. If the departing spouse retains her 50 units, can she then continue 
to collect half of the trust's income (her ex-husband's wages) for the duration of the trust? 
Since answers to questions of this nature are so uncertain, this is obviously one area where 
the potential for litigation is enormous. 
4. The board of trustees normally includes the grantor, his spouse, and at  least one 
unrelated party. The trustees are generally paid a substantial amount of compensation 
by the trust for their services in this capacity. 
The integral relationship between family members in various family estate trust 
capacities presents notorious opportunities for abuse. Some promoters of this type of trust 
maintain that the family residence, having previously been transferred to the trust, can 
be lived in without cost to the husband and wife (trustees) because they are protecting 
and caring for trust assets; further claims include the deductibility of dinner between 
Mom and Dad because they are really cotrustees discussing trust business. See Hill, Tax 
Cuts for Sale, Wall St. J . ,  July 13, 1977 at  1, col. 5. 
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the applicable Treasury Regulations. The Internal Revenue Serv- 
ice, however, through revenue  ruling^,^ news releases,%nd litiga- 
tion7 has launched a vigorous attack against the trust. In its at- 
tack the IRS relies primarily on the following two arguments: 
First, the assignment of services is in fact an assignment of in- 
come taxable to the assignor under I.R.C. § 61(a)(l); and second, 
the retained control over the trust and the lack of an adverse 
party on the board of trustees make the trust income taxable to 
the grantor under I.R.C. $0 671-677. 
A. Assignment of Services or Assignment of Income? 
I .  The position of the IRS 
The primary argument made by the IRS against the family 
estate trust is that the assignment of services by the grantor to 
the trust is in economic reality no more than an assignment of 
income. The abatement of income tax liability through this sort 
of income assignment has been prohibited by an unbroken string 
of Supreme Court decisions originating with Lucas v .  EarP 
In Lucas the wage earner and his wife entered into a contract 
stipulating that any income received by the husband was to be 
considered joint income to both. Subsequently, the husband filed 
a tax return claiming only one-half his earnings as income. The 
IRS responded by assessing a deficiency. The Supreme Court 
held that such an arrangement, although legal under state law, 
would not be recognized under the Internal Revenue Code? The 
Court declared that income would be taxed to the earner without 
regard to "anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skil- 
fully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even 
for a second in the man who earned it."Io 
In three recent Tax Court cases the IRS has relied on the 
Lucas rationale and has successfully taken the position that fam- 
ily estate trusts are anticipatory arrangements devised to divert 
income from its earner. Consequently, in these cases trust income 
has been found to be taxable to the earner personally under I.R.C. 
§ 61(a)(l).I1 
5. Rev. Rul. 75-258, 1975-2 C.B. 503; Rev. Rul. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251. 
6. I.R.S. News Release No. 1878, Aug. 31, 1977. 
7. Wesenberg v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 559 (1978); Damm v. Commissioner, 36 
T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977); Horvat v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1977). 
8. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See, e.g., United States v. Basye, 410 U S .  441 (1973); Com- 
missioner v. Culbertson, 337 U S .  733 (1949). 
9. 281 U.S. at 114. 
10. Id. at 115. 
11. I.R.C. Ei 61(a)(l) reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
FAMILY ESTATE TRUSTS 
In Horvat v. Commissioner, l2 the taxpayer contracted to give 
to his family estate trust "exclusive use of [his] lifetime services 
and all resultant earned remuneration."13 Thereafter, Horvath 
employer continued issuing payroll checks to the taxpayer, who 
then endorsed them over to the trust. Horvat failed to include as 
personal income any of his salary received subsequent to the crea- 
tion of the trust, and the IRS claimed a deficiency. The Tax Court 
held in favor of the Service, primarily relying on the following 
factors: First, there was no substantial business purpose for the 
trust; second, there was no privity between the trust and the 
employer since the services performed and the business activity 
conducted were those of the petitioner and not of the trust; and 
third, the petitioner retained control of the earnings.14 
A similar arrangement was again rejected in Damm v. 
Commissioner. l5 Damm, like Horvat, conveyed his assets and as- 
signed his personal services to his family estate trust and notified 
his employer of the assignment. Damm sent his employer the 
Internal Revenue Service Employer Identification Number that 
had been assigned to the trust and requested that all future pay- 
roll checks be made payable to the trust directly. The employer 
refused to comply with the request and continued to issue the 
payroll checks to Damm, who then endorsed them over to the 
trust. The court held in favor of the IRS for three reasons: the 
trust was not a party to the employment contracts; the disposi- 
tion of earned income remained with Damm; and Damm, ir- 
respective of the trust, retained control over the manner in which 
the income was earned.16 
Most recently, in the case of Wesenberg v. Commis~ioner,~~ 
a doctor employed as an instructor a t  the University of Colorado 
Medical School formed a family estate trust and requested that 
the school make all future payroll checks payable to the "Richard 
L. Wesenberg Family Estate (A Trust)." The employer complied 
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the 
following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions and similar 
items . . . . " See United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); Commissioner v. Culbert- 
son, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). 
12. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1977). In Horvat two cases were decided together; both 
petitioners argued pro se. The factual situation in Rev. Rul. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251, is 
virtually identical to that of Horvat. 
13. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 477. 
14. Id. at 478-79. 
15. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977). 
16. Id. at 796. 
17. 69 T.C. 559 (1978). 
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with the request and subsequently sent all paychecks directly to 
the trust. Nevertheless, the Tax Court found that 
the ultimate direction and control over the earning of the com- 
pensation rested in Richard and not in the Trust. While Richard 
may have conveyed, a t  least in form, his services to the Trust, 
in substance he was not a bona fide servant or agent of the Trust 
with respect to the services he rendered the school.1u 
As in Horvat and Damm,, the Tax Court in Wesenberg based its 
holding on the findings that the trust had no privity of contract 
with the third-party employer and the ultimate control over earn- 
ings was retained by Wesenberg and not the trust.lg 
2. The position of the trust proponents 
The proponents of the family estate trust have not been dis- 
couraged by the results in Horvat, Damm, and Wesenberg. Al- 
though they admit that the mere assignment of income is taxable 
under I.R.C. 8 61(a)(l) and Lucas u. Earl, they argue that in a 
properly constructed family estate trust there is no assignment of 
income a t  all. In all three cases cited above, the income earner 
contracted with his employer in an individual capacity rather 
than as trustee. The trust, therefore, was not privy to the employ- 
ment contract but was merely designated to receive the employ- 
ment income. If, on the other hand, the trust itself is the contract- 
ing party and as such effectively leases out the services of the 
trust employee to a third-party employer, the assignment of in- 
come theory should not apply. Trust proponents, asserting that 
the question of control by the trust over the employee is disposi- 
tive, point to the "leased employee" doctrine as authority for 
their conclusion that the trust employee should only be taxed on 
the income actually paid him by the trust.20 
The validity of a taxpayer's leasing his services to a corporate 
18. Id. a t  562. The court concluded its opinion by stating: "Indeed, considering 
Richard's education and intellectual ability, we find it difficult to believe that he envis- 
ioned the Trust as anything other than a flagrant tax avoidance scheme." Id. at 564. In 
addition to back taxes and interest, Wesenberg was assessed a five percent penalty "due 
to negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations (but without intent to de- 
fraud)." I.R.C. Ji 6653(a). 
19. 69 T.C. at 562. In addition to the assignment of income theory, the Tax Court 
also held that Wesenberg was taxable on the trust income under the grantor trust provi- 
sions, I.R.C. Ji Ji 674, 676-677.69 T.C. at 564. 
20. See Brief for Petitioner at 20, Damm v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 
(1977); EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHERS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE HORVAT TAX COURT DECI- 
SION AND THE 1975 &VENUE RULINGS ON FAMILY TRUSTS 2 (1977) (promotional pamphlet 
distributed by E.S. Publishers, Houston, Tex.). 
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entity has been firmly established since the early case of Charles 
Laughton. 21 In this case, Laughton, the majority stockholder in a 
closely held corporation, leased his talents and services to the 
corporation. The corporation then contracted out the services of 
its employee to various film studios, which paid the corporation 
an amount significantly greater than that paid to the employee 
as salary. The Tax Court held in favor of the taxpayer, who had 
paid taxes only on the amount of salary paid to him by the corpo- 
ration. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld Laughton's leased 
employee argument because two conditions were present: First, 
the corporation was controlled by a board of directors that could 
exercise independent management discretion, notwithstanding 
the fact that the employee was the majority stockholder; and 
second, the corporation was established for the non-tax-related, 
independent business purpose of joining efforts "with other em- 
ployees of the company to create motion pictures."22 
Trust proponents argue that the same rationale applies to 
the family estate trust. If the trust has an independent business 
reason for its existence and is the contracting agent with the 
third-party employer for the services of the leased employee, the 
employee should only be liable for the income he receives from 
the trust regardless of what is actually paid to the trust by the 
third-party employer. 
3. Analysis of the IRS'and trust proponents'positions 
The IRS is primarily concerned with whether or not the trust 
is a sham device used to divert income from its earner to lessen 
tax liability. On the other hand, trust proponents contend the 
trust itself qualifies as the income earner under the leased em- 
ployee doctrine. 
The Service's position stems from the early case of Higgins 
v. Smith,23 where the Supreme Court upheld the Treasury De- 
partment's right to look beyond the mere form of a corporate 
entity. The Court stated: 
The Government may look at actualities and upon determina- 
tion that the form employed for doing business or carrying out 
the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may sustain or 
disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the purposes of 
21. 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939), remanded, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940). See also Rubin v. 
Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970); Fontaine Fox, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938). 
22. 113 F.2d 103, 104 (9th Cir. 1940). 
23. 308 US. 473 (1940). 
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the tax statute. To hold otherwise would permit the schemes of 
taxpayers to supersede legislation in the determination of the 
time and manner of taxation. It is command of income and its 
benefits which marks the real owner of property.24 
Relying on the Higgins rationale, the IRS has challenged the 
tax status of numerous entities under the general captions of 
"sham transaction" and "substance over form"; but, as demon- 
strated in Laughton, the Service's determinations have not al- 
ways been upheld by the courts. The courts appear to hold that 
if there is a bona fide business purpose for a leased employee 
relationship other than the reduction of taxes, and if the taxpayer 
complies with the letter of congressional tax legislation and state 
incorporation statutes, the IRS will be precluded from resorting 
to the subjective "common law of taxation"25 approach inherent 
in the use of the general captions. Although the IRS clearly has 
authority to ascertain the economic reality of a trust entity, the 
leased employee doctrine may shelter the family estate trust as 
long as the assignment of services by the grantor to the trust is 
based on a non-tax-related business purpose. 
In relying on the leased employee doctrine to support their 
defense of the family estate trust, however, trust advocates have 
assumed a heavy burden. Even if the family estate trust complies 
with the letter of the law, the real issue is whether the assignment 
of services to the family estate trust has sufficient justification, 
aside from tax avoidance, to overcome the IRS contention that 
the device is a sham. Both Laughton and the recent family estate 
trust cases emphasized the importance of finding an independent 
business purpose to justify the leased employee relationship. For 
example, the appellate court in Laughton carefully considered 
the Higgins admonition and concluded: 
We take the [Higgins] opinion to mean that  the "tax 
event" is not an unreal attempt to use a corporation for a sham 
transaction, procuring an advantageous tax consequence to the 
taxpayer, if it may be considered as one primarily for an inde- 
pendent business purpose and not a transfer of assets (here 
Laughton's services), with a retention of their control, solely to 
reduce tax liability.26 
Similarly, in Horvat the court noted: 
24. Id. at 477-78. 
25. See Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 S .  CAL. L. REV. 235 
(1961). 
26. 113 F.2d at 104 (emphasis added). 
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While it is true that a viable business entity actually engaged 
in business activity cannot be ignored, herein the conclusion is 
inescapable that petitioners' family trusts were nothing more 
than a vehicle designed to lessen petitioners' tax burden; clearly 
the "tax laws permit no such easy road to tax a~oidance."~~ 
The IRS should be required to recognize the validity of the 
trust entity only if a bona fide business purpose for the trust can 
be shown. Thus, to withstand IRS attack, the family estate trust 
must be able to demonstrate a reason for its existence other than 
reduction of tax liability. 
Considering the traditional emphasis by promoters of the 
family estate trust on the tax-saving aspects of the device, i t  may 
be quite difficult to show that any particular trust was estab- 
lished primarily for an independent business purpose. There are, 
however, benefits associated with such a trust arrangement that 
are not tax related and that might be asserted as legitimate, 
independent purposes for establishing a family estate trust. For 
example, the grantor might want to relinquish management res- 
ponsibilities for his businesses to a professional management firm 
that would serve as trustee. The trust device also allows a grantor 
to arrange his affairs so as to avoid the publicity and expense of 
probate proceedings following his death. Nevertheless, the courts 
thus far have only considered independent business purposes; 
therefore, the aforementioned trust benefits may not be sufficient 
to satisfy the test unless the IRS and the courts will extend it to 
encompass purposes beyond those currently described as business 
purposes. 
Should a true business purpose for a family estate trust be 
found, yet another dilemma arises to confront an unwary trustor. 
Although the trust may not then be vulnerable to an assignment 
of income attack, the establishment of a business purpose will 
lend credence to an alternative IRS contention that the family 
estate trust is an association properly taxable as a corporation 
under I.R.C. $ 7701. Section 7701 and its corresponding Treasury 
regulations provide that if a trust has the function and appear- 
ance of a corporation it will be taxed as a corporation." 
27. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 478-79 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 452 (1973)). 
28. See Rev. Rul. 75-258, 1975-2 C.B. 503. The contention that a family estate trust 
is an association taxable as a corporation under I.R.C. 4 7701 comes from an expanded 
reading of Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). Morrissey set forth a test to 
distinguish between a private trust and a business trust taxable as a corporation. This 
test has been embodied into a Treasury regulation which provides: 
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In addition to the above difficulties, the grantor/employee 
may be forced to eschew the position of trustee. A primary factor 
in the vigorous prosecution of the family estate trust by the IRS 
is the fact that the same person often fills the four positions of 
grantor, employee, trustee, and beneficiary. Although a single 
person may fill all four capacities under state trust law, such 
blatant control over a taxable entity invites the close scrutiny of 
IRS auditors. 
If conservation of assets for the family, avoidance of probate, 
and other such nontax considerations are the real purposes of the 
trust, then these purposes can be served through an arrangement 
whereby outsiders serve as trustees. The grantorlemployee can 
remove the taint of sham from the assignment of his services by 
having noncontrolled trustees negotiate with the third-party 
employers instead of doing it himself while wearing his trustee 
hat. But removing the appearance of sham by divesting the gran- 
tor of all power and control over the trust results in an untenable 
loss of the grantor's personal and economic freedom. First, by 
allowing an unrelated trustee to negotiate the third-party em- 
ployment contracts, the employee is obligated to labor where, 
when, and for whatever wages the trustee dictates. Depending on 
the trust instrument, this condition of near servitude could con- 
tinue for the twenty-five year duration of the trust. Second, the 
use of unrelated trustees in an irrevocable trust instrument re- 
moves from the grantor the very control over the family estate 
that the the trust was designed to provide. Essentially, the gran- 
tor would be making the unconscionable exchange of personal 
freedom for freedom from taxation. The alternative format sug- 
gested clearly represents a drastic change from the current family 
The term "association" refers to an organization whose characteristics re- 
quire it to be classified for purposes of taxation as a corporation rather than as 
another type of organization such as a partnership or a trust. There are a num- 
ber of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure corporation which, taken 
together, distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (i) Associates, (ii) 
an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity 
of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts lim- 
ited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests. . . . An 
organization will be treated as an association if the corporate characteristics are 
such that the organization more nearly resembles a corporation than a partner- 
ship or trust. 
Treas. Reg. O 301.7701-2(a)(1), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409 (emphasis added). 
The IRS contends the family estate trust possesses associates, business purposes, and 
a preponderance of corporate characteristics over noncorporate characteristics and is 
therefore an association taxable as a corporation. See Elmer Irvin Trust, 29 T.C. 846 
(1958). 
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estate trust instrument, yet the fact remains that the greater the 
apparent control over the trust by the grantor, the greater the 
likelihood of IRS challenge. 
B. Family Estate Trusts as Grantor Trusts 
In addition to the assignment of income theory, the Internal 
Revenue Service has attacked family estate trusts under the gran- 
tor trust provisions of I.R.C. § 8 671-677.29 In essence, these sec- 
tions provide that income placed in trust will remain taxable to 
the grantor to the extent that he retains a reversionary interest 
in the trust property, or beneficial enjoyment of income from the 
trust corpus without the prior approval of an adverse party.30 An 
adverse party is defined as any individual "having a substantial 
beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected 
by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he possesses 
respecting the trust."31 Accordingly, a trustee does not qualify as 
an adverse party unless he also has a substantial beneficial inter- 
est in the trust itself.32 
1. The  position of the IRS 
The Internal Revenue Service's position that family estate 
t rus ts  are grantor t rusts  was expressed in  D a m m  u .  
C o m m i ~ s i o n e r . ~ ~  Although the case was ultimately decided on the 
assignment of income theory, the Service argued alternatively 
that the family estate trust was subject to the grantor trust provi- 
sions of sections 671-677. Counsel for the IRS defined the purpose 
behind the grantor trust provisions: 
[Tlhe obvious purpose behind the grantor trust provisions is to 
ensure that the grantor has not used the trust as a device to 
escape taxation on the income of the trust property while retain- 
ing his effective access to the property andlor income. If such 
power is retained by the grantor or by an individual not having 
an interest in the trust adverse to the exercise of such power, 
then the grantor is deemed to be the owner of that portion over 
which he has retained such control.34 
29. Rev. Rul. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251; see Paxton v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 923 (9th 
Cir. 1975), Brief for Respondent at 22, Damm v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 
(1977). 
30. I.R.C. § 674(a). 
31. I.R.C. § 672(a). 
32. Paxton v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 923,928 (9th Cir. 1975); Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)- 
l(a) (1956). 
33. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977). 
34. Brief for Respondent at 22-23, Damm v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 
(1977). 
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In the family estate trust there are no named beneficiaries as 
such; rather, the grantor receives "units of beneficial interest" in 
exchange for the assets transferred and personal services assigned 
to the trust. The grantor can then either retain the units or dis- 
tribute them to his spouse, children, or other trusts. In Damm the 
IRS not only contended that the grantor was taxable on the units 
he retained, but argued that he was taxable on the entire trust 
income. The IRS maintained that there could be no adverse party 
among trustees whose beneficial interest in the trust was deter- 
mined by possession of "units."35 Essentially, the IRS argued that 
if a trustee's interest is represented by such units, he will receive 
a fixed proportion of the proceeds of the trust regardless of 
whether the trust is cancelled or continued. Such a trustee would 
not be an adverse party because his interests would not be ad- 
versely affected by the exercise of his power as trustee.36 There- 
fore, the IRS argued, the grantor should be taxed on the entire 
trust income as he could control its disposition without the con- 
sent of any adverse party.37 
2. The  position of the trust porponents 
Proponents of the family estate trust obviously contend that 
trust income should not be taxed to the grantor under sections 
671-677. While they have distinct rationales for each grantor trust 
provision in the Code, the basis for their argument is that, in a 
properly structured family estate trust, the beneficial enjoyment 
of the trust is controlled by adverse parties and the remainder 
interests vest in the beneficiaries instead of reverting to the gran- 
tor. 
Since the assets of a family estate trust are distributed to the 
holders of the units of beneficial interest upon termination of the 
trust, the grantor of the trust retains a reversionary interest in the 
trust corpus only to the extent that he retains units of beneficial 
interest. Trust proponents assert that section 673, which taxes the 
grantor's reversionary interests in either trust corpus or income,3R 
35. Id. at 25. 
36. Id. 
37. Section 674(a) indicates that a grantor will be considered the owner of that por- 
tion of a trust over which he retains a power of disposition without the approval or consent 
of an adverse party. The IRS' argument that a trustee in a family estate trust cannot be 
an adverse party because distributions of trust income andlor corpus would be made in 
proportion to his holdings of beneficial units, if valid, would result in the grantor being 
taxable under 5 674(a). 
38. Section 673(a) states: 
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in which 
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therefore would not apply to units transferred to other beneficiar- 
ies. 
As for trust income, trust proponents argue the grantor has 
not retained sufficient power over the family estate trust to be 
taxable under section 674. Section 674 taxes trust income to the 
grantor only to the extent that the grantor can control the benefi- 
cial enjoyment of the trust income without the consent of an 
adverse party.39 In contrast to the IRS contention that holders of 
units cannot qualify as adverse parties, the trust proponents 
argue that such units represent proportionate shares in the equi- 
table ownership of the trust equal to any other beneficial interest 
in trust property. Accordingly, it is the proponents' position that 
a trustee who holds units of beneficial interest is an adverse party 
as defined by section 672(a).40 
The question of retained beneficial enjoyment also arises 
under section 675 and regulation 1.675-1," which tax the grantor 
if he can obtain financial benefits from dealing with the trust that 
would not be available in an arm's length t ran~ac t ion .~~ In the 
family estate trust, retained administrative powers over the trust 
should not raise difficulties if the trust instrument requires all 
transactions between the grantor and the trust to be on an arm's 
length basis. This "arm's length," however, may be difficult for 
the grantor of such a trust to maintain within the embrace of his 
own family. 
Trust proponents argue that the rule of section 676, which 
provides that a grantor will be personally taxed on trust income 
if he or a nonadverse party has power to revoke the trust or return 
the corpus to the grantor, is inapplicable in the family estate trust 
situation. They point to the fact that the power to terminate the 
he has a reversionary interest in either the corpus or the income therefrom if, 
as of the inception of that portion of the trust, the interest will or may reason- 
ably be expected to take effect in possession or enjoyment within 10 years com- 
mencing with the date of the transfer of that portion of the trust. 
39. I.R.C. 4 674(a). 
40. Section 672(a) defines an adverse party as "any person having a substantial 
beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonex- 
ercise of the power which he possesses respecting the trust." 
41. Section 675 provides in effect that the grantor is treated as the owner 
of any portion of a trust if under the terms of the trust instrument or circumstan- 
ces attendant on its operation administrative control is exercisable primarily for 
the benefit of the grantor rather than the beneficiaries of the trust. 
Treas. Reg. Si 1.675-1(a) (1956). 
42. E.g., receiving interest-free loans from the trust, dealing with the trust for less 
than full and adequate consideration, retaining the power to control the investment of 
trust funds in a nonfiduciary capacity. 
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trust is vested in the trustees, the majority of whom are adverse 
parties, and that upon termination the assets of the trust are to 
be distributed to the beneficiaries of the trust rather than revert- 
ing to the grantor. 
Finally, the proponents contend that only if the grantor or a 
nonadverse party has a power to distribute income to or for the 
benefit of the grantor or his spouse will he be taxed under the 
provisions of section 677." This rule should be inapplicable to the 
family estate trust since such powers are vested in the trustees, 
the majority of whom are adverse parties. In any event, it can 
apply only to the extent the grantor retains units of beneficial 
interest .44 
3. Analysis of the IRS' and trust proponents' positions 
From this brief review of the positions of the IRS and trust 
proponents as to the applicability of the grantor trust sections of 
the Code, it is apparent that the determinative issue is whether 
a trustee who holds units of beneficial interest qualifies as an 
adverse party. Contrary to the position of the IRS, the answer to 
this question would appear to depend upon the substantiality of 
the interests held by the trustee, and not upon the nature or form 
of those interests. 
When the IRS argued in Damm that a trustee holding units 
of beneficial interest could never qualify as an adverse party,45 it 
took a position that is not supported by the Code, Treasury regu- 
lations, or case law. By way of definition, section 672(a) states in 
part that "the term 'adverse party' means any person having a 
substantial beneficial interest in the trust."46 The regulations 
elaborate on the substantiality criterion by stating that "[aln 
interest is a substantial interest if its value in relation to the value 
of the property subject to the power is not insignificant. "47 Thus, 
the real issue in determining whether a trustee holding units of 
beneficial interest in a family estate trust qualifies as an adverse 
party is the substantiality of his interest in relation to the total 
value of the trust assets. Neither the Code nor the regulations 
43. Section 677(a) deals with the treatment of a grantor who retains the right to 
receive trust income either for himself or his spouse. The section applies even if the income 
is not received in cash but is used to purchase life insurance policies on the grantor or his 
spouse. 
44. Proponents' grantor trust arguments were primarily derived from EDUCATIONAL 
SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHERS, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
45. See Brief for Respondent, Damm v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977). 
46. I.R.C. § 672(a) (emphasis added). 
47. Treas. Reg. 5 l.672(a) -l(a) (1956) (emphasis added). 
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require that the beneficial interest be expressed in terms of an 
absolute figure or percentage of trust assets rather than as a speci- 
fied number of units of beneficial interest. The form in which the 
trustee's interest is held should be irrelevant as long as a determi- 
nation can be made as to its value in relation to the total value 
of all interests in the trust assets. 
Recent case law affirms that the courts also consider the 
substantiality of the interest rather than the form in which the 
interest is held in determining whether a party is adverse under 
section 672(a). In Paxton v. Commi~sioner ,~~ the Ninth Circuit 
discussed the adverseness of a trustee who held "Certificates of 
Interest" representing units in a family estate trust. The trustee 
in question held 192 of a total of 5,000 units of interest in the 
trust. The court affirmed the lower court's finding that the 3.84% 
interest represented by the trustee's 192 units was not substantial 
enough to qualify him as an adverse party in relation to the entire 
trust corpus and income? In so doing, however, the court noted 
that the trustee was an adverse party as to his 3.84% interest and 
indicated that he could have been an adverse party as to the 
entire trust if the units he held represented a somewhat greater 
percentage of the total value of the trust assets.50 Thus, the court 
concerned itself entirely with the substantiality of the trustee's 
interest and did not automatically disqualify the trustee because 
his interest was expressed in "units" rather than more conven- 
tionally as a percentage of the trust assets. 
Similarly, in Wesenberg v.  Commissioner" the Tax Court 
considered a case involving units of beneficial interest in a family 
estate trust situation. After quoting the definition of adverse par- 
ties under section 672(a), the court concluded that a beneficiary 
holding "units" was an adverse party.52 In this case, however, 
none of the trustees was a beneficiary and therefore the trust 
income was found to be taxable to the grantor since he could 
exercise his powers over the trust income and corpus without the 
consent or approval of an adverse party.53 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that neither the In- 
48. 520 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1975). 
49. Id. at 926-27. 
50. Id. at 927. 
51. 69 T.C. 559 (1978). 
52. Id. at 563. 
53. Id. 
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ternal Revenue Service nor the proponents of the trust are ap- 
proaching the family estate trust issue from an entirely objective 
position. The IRS treats this device as a sham and attempts to 
place on the taxpayer the burden of justifying the trust as a 
taxable entity.54 In recent years the IRS has won every Tax Court 
challenge of the trust," and the United States Courts of Appeal 
have made it plain that the clearly erroneous doctrine will apply 
to these Tax Court de~isions.~"eversal has never been granted 
in favor of the taxpayer in a family estate trust case. 
On the other hand, none of the cases brought to trial by the 
Service has involved a trust providing for privity of contract be- 
tween the trust and the third-party employer so as to raise the 
"leased employee" issue.57 In addition, none of the trusts chal- 
lenged in court thus far has provided a substantial beneficial 
interest to the trustees so as to directly challenge the Service's 
position on the adverse party issue. 
It remains to be seen what the result will be when the IRS 
finally challenges a family estate trust that meets the letter of the 
law in both of the above areas. Supporting the Service's position 
is basic federal tax policy which requires that "the realities of the 
54. Bernuth v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1972). 
55. Wesenberg v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 559 (1978); Damm v. Commissioner, 36 
T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977); Horvat v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1977). The 
success record of the IRS in litigating family estate trust cases is a t  least partly due to 
the fact that it has complete discretion to choose which cases it  will prosecute. 
56. E.g., Paxton v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1975); Paster v. Com- 
missioner, 245 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1957); see FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
57. In the case of Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), Judge Friendly 
again considered the leased employee doctrine: 
"Loaned employee" cases such as this reveal a tension between competing 
policies on tax law. On one side is the principle of a graduated income tax, which 
is undercut when individuals are permitted to split their income with others or 
to spread it over several years. Lucas v. Earl. . . . Opposing this is the policy 
of recognizing the corporation as a taxable entity distinct from its shareholders 
in all but extreme cases. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 
(1943). 
Id. at  652 (citations omitted). In Rubin the court reversed the Tax Court's determination 
of taxpayer liability based upon the "common law of taxation" and remanded to the Tax 
Court to make a new determination utilizing the provisions of 5 482. Judge Friendly 
castigated the Tax Court's use of arbitrary and clouded tax terms: 
References to "substance over form" and the "true earner" of income 
merely restate the issue in cases.like this: Who is the "true earner"? What is 
substance and what is form? Moreover, [the Tax Court does] so in a way which 
makes it appear that these questions can be answered simply by viewing the 
facts with appropriate suspicion. 
429 F.2d at  653. For an interesting diatribe on the lRSY attacks on the family estate trust, 
see Tkach, The Pure Equity Trust-How I Use It to Beat the IRS and Malpractice 
Lawyers, PRIVATE PRAC., Dec. 1976, a t  15. 
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taxpayer's economic interest, rather than the niceties of the con- 
veyancer's art, . . . determine the power to tax."" Moreover, 
since Lucas v. EarlSB the Supreme Court has repeatedly taken the 
pbsftion that assignment of income to another will not relieve its 
earner of tax assessment regardless of compliance with state 
law.Bo The family estate trust carries an additional burden be- 
cause it involves the grantor's family members in beneficiary and 
trustee capacities and accordingly invites the "special scrutiny" 
which the Supreme Court has declared is necessary "where the 
parties to a transfer are members of the same family group."61 
Family estate trusts can conceivably be constructed to con- 
form with the literal requirements of trust law, the leased em- 
ployee doctrine, and sections 61 and 671-677. However, to con- 
struct a trust which will withstand the "sham" caption attack by 
the IRS, the grantor may be forced to relinquish to noncontrolled 
trustees such control over his own affairs as to render himself a 
virtual slave to his family estate trust. The very instrument by 
which a taxpayer seeks to "free" himself from the burden of taxes 
may result in the forfeiture of freedoms more substantial than the 
freedom from taxation. The creation of such a trust is possible but 
i t  has yet to be tested in court. 
In the meantime, family estate trusts are being vigorously 
promoted across the nation, and the IRS is challenging them on 
all fronts. Anyone purchasing such a trust should, for the present, 
be prepared to either pay back taxes, interest, and penalties when 
challenged by the Service, or defend his trust in court with little 
prospect of prevailing. 
Dennis M. Richardson 
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59. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
60. United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 
591 (1948); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
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